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[1] This paper examines the impact of arsenic contamination of groundwater on sale
prices of residential properties and bare land transactions in two Maine towns, Buxton and
Hollis, that rely on private wells to supply their drinking water. Prompted by tests of
well water by the state of Maine, media attention focused on the communities in 1993
and 1994 when 14% of private wells were found to have arsenic concentrations
exceeding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standard of 0.05 mg/L. Households
could mitigate the serious health risks associated with arsenic ingestion by purchasing
bottled water or by installing a reverse osmosis home treatment system. Our results
indicate that the initial arsenic finding in 1993 led to significant, but temporary, 2 year
decreases in property prices. This is a much shorter effect on prices than has been observed
for Superfund sites, where prices can be depressed for a decade. These results suggest
that a property‐specific contamination incident that is treatable may not have a long‐lasting
effect on sale prices, but further research is needed to confirm if the dissipation of the
price effect was actually due to the installation of in‐home water treatment systems or due
to the dissipation of perceived risk once the media coverage stopped.
Citation: Boyle, K. J., N. V. Kuminoff, C. Zhang, M. Devanney, and K. P. Bell (2010), Does a property‐specific environmental
health risk create a “neighborhood” housing price stigma? Arsenic in private well water, Water Resour. Res., 46, W03507,
doi:10.1029/2009WR008074.
1. Introduction
[2] Arsenic in drinking water is a global problem.
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, China, Hungary,
India, Mexico, Peru, Thailand, and the United States all have
areas with arsenic concentrations above the recommended
maximum contaminant level for drinking water [World
Health Organization (WHO), 2001]. In many of these
countries a large share of the population is affected. For
example, arsenic contamination of groundwater in Bangla-
desh has put between 46 and 57 million of the 130 million
inhabitants at risk [WHO, 2001]. In the United States, arsenic
can pose a serious concern for homes on private well water in
areas with high levels of naturally occurring arsenic.
[3] Long‐term exposure to drinking water with con-
centrations of arsenic above 0.05 mg/L can cause severe
health risks. The most severe risks associated with chronic
ingestion of arsenic in drinking water include develop-
ing skin, bladder, and lung cancers [U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), 2001; WHO, 2001; Smith et al.,
1999]. A study by Smith et al. [1998] estimated that
between 7% and 10% of all adult deaths in Chile between
1989 and 1993 were due to bladder and lung cancers
attributable to arsenic exposure. Exposure to arsenic has also
been shown to cause blood vessel damage, changes in skin
pigmentation, and hyperkeratosis (thickening of the outer
skin layer) [WHO, 2001]. Additionally, low‐level exposure
to arsenic in drinking water (0.01 to 0.02 mg/L) may lead to
an increased risk of depression, while exposure to arsenic
concentrations above 0.01 mg/L leads to a significantly
higher risk of high blood pressure, circulatory problems and
the need for cardiac bypass surgery [Zierold et al., 2004].
[4] In response to growing concern about the adverse
health effects of chronic arsenic ingestion, the EPA lowered
the maximum contaminant level (MCL) for arsenic con-
centrations in public water systems from 0.05 mg/L to
0.01 mg/L [EPA, 2001]. This new standard took effect in
January 2006.
[5] When revising the MCL standard the EPA estimated
that as many as 12.8 million people are exposed to arsenic
concentrations in excess of 0.01 mg/L in drinking water
supplied by public water systems [EPA, 2001]. The new
arsenic standard aids in mitigating adverse health effects for
the people who rely on these systems for their drinking
water. Suburban and rural residents who rely on private
wells for their drinking water, however, must choose to have
their tap water tested for the presence of arsenic and must
pay to have private treatment systems installed in their
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homes if the test result indicates an arsenic concentration
that is unsafe.
[6] This paper examines the impact of arsenic contami-
nation of private well water on sale prices of single‐family,
residential properties and bare land transactions (potentially
developable for residences) in two Maine towns where
arsenic contamination has been well documented, Buxton
and Hollis. Maine is the northeastern most state in the United
States, located along the Canadian border. Figure 1 shows
the locations of Buxton and Hollis, located next to each
other in York County in the southwestern part of Maine.
Media attention focused on these communities in the early
1990s when well water tests exhibited arsenic concentra-
tions above the EPA standard, at that time, of 0.05 mg/L
[Maine Geological Survey, 2005]. All households in these
communities rely on private wells to supply their drinking
water; there are no public drinking water systems. A study
by Marvinney et al. [1994] found that 14% of private wells
in Buxton and Hollis exceeded the (pre‐2006) EPA standard
for arsenic of 0.05 mg/L.
[7] Buxton and Hollis were the first communities in
Maine to have documented arsenic contamination of well
water. Prior to this event arsenic contamination was not
something that homeowners would have been likely to
consider and there were no other known contaminants in
well water in this area. We investigate whether knowledge
of arsenic in groundwater, and consequently drinking water,
depressed sale prices of houses in Buxton and Hollis,
Maine, and test whether this price effect dissipated through
time as residents may have installed private treatment sys-
tems in their homes.
2. Previous Research
[8] Economic analysis of health effects of arsenic con-
tamination of drinking water is a subject that has received
little attention. Estimation of the economic benefits of
avoiding arsenic in drinking water has mostly been con-
ducted in south Asia. Ahmad et al. [2005] found that rural
Bangladesh households would pay about 0.25% of average
household income for arsenic free drinking water. Maddison
et al. [2005] estimated the aggregate willingness to pay to
avoid arsenic health impacts in Bangladesh is $2.7 billion
annually. Roy [2008] found that households in North 24
Parganas and Midnapore, India would pay about $7 per
month for water with an arsenic concentration below
0.05 mg/L.
[9] Research in the United States demonstrates that some,
but not all, households in an arsenic cluster invest in self
protection through averting behavior, and that home treat-
ment systems can be cost effective. Shaw et al. [2005] found
that 38% of the households in Churchill County, Nevada
with private wells treat their tap [see also Walker et al.,
2005, 2006]. The median concentration of arsenic in
Churchill County well water is 0.26 mg/L, well above the
current EPA standard of 0.01 mg/L. In a different area with
arsenic concentrations above the MCL, Outagamie County,
Wisconsin, Jakus et al. [2009] found that residents with
higher perceived health risks of arsenic exposure tend to
purchase more bottled water. Sargent‐Michaud et al. [2006],
using data from Maine, found that home water treatment
systems are generally more cost effective than buying
bottled water to avoid exposure to arsenic in drinking
water.
[10] The results from the studies by Shaw and colleagues
suggest that arsenic concentrations above the MCL in tap
water may have an effect on sale prices of homes. If a
potential homebuyer knows that a home water treatment
system needs to be installed to protect their families’ health
from arsenic concentrations, this knowledge should reduce
the price they would be willing to pay for a home that has an
arsenic concentration above the MCL in the tap water and
does not have a treatment system installed. However,
Walker et al. [2005, p. 305] also speculate that the 62% of
households who do not treat their tap water do “…not rec-
ognize that consumption could have associate health risks,”
which would hinder the ability to estimate any price effect
from the presence of arsenic in tap water.
[11] No studies, to our knowledge, have investigated the
relationship between sale prices of residential properties and
arsenic contamination, and few studies have investigated the
relationship between sales prices and health risks from
consumption of contaminated tap water. We identified one
study that investigated the relationship between nitrate
contamination of groundwater and sale prices of residential
properties in Portage County, Wisconsin [Malone and
Barrows, 1990]. They found that nitrate contamination of
groundwater did not affect sale prices. The health conse-
Figure 1. The towns of Buxton and Hollis, located in York
County,Maine. Buxton is located at 43°38′7″N, 70°32′21″W,
and Hollis is located at 43°38′5″N, 70°37′15″W.
BOYLE ET AL.: HOUSING PRICE STIGMA DUE TO ARSENIC IN PRIVATE WELL WATER W03507W03507
2 of 10
quence of consuming water with nitrate contamination is
blue baby syndrome, which is not fatal. The health con-
sequences of arsenic are more severe and one might expect
arsenic contamination to be more likely to impact sale prices
than nitrate contamination.
[12] The vast majority of hedonic studies that have
investigated the effects of water quality on sale prices of
residential properties have focused on contamination of
surface waters that are not used as drinking water supplies
[see Boyle and Kiel, 2001, exhibit 2, p. 124]. These studies
have focused almost exclusively on the recreational and/or
aesthetic aspects of water quality as they pertain to property
values. They have demonstrated significant suppression of
sale prices for a wide variety of surface water contamination
events.
[13] There have also been a number of hedonic property
value studies that have investigated the relationship between
sale prices and proximity to undesirable land (e.g., Super-
fund or hazardous waste disposal sites) uses where one of
the consequences is groundwater contamination [see Boyle
and Kiel, 2001, exhibit 3, pp. 127–130]. These studies
have generally used proximity to the undesirable land use as
the key environmental variable in their hedonic price func-
tions, which makes it impossible to identify a groundwater‐
specific effect. One of these studies [Kiel, 1995] considered
an application where there was known groundwater con-
tamination from two nearby Superfund sites. These were
sites that had been in industrial use since the mid‐1800s and
groundwater contamination was accompanied by contami-
nated soils and unpleasant odors. Even though safe drinking
water was provided to nearby households while U.S. EPA
administered cleanup was undertaken at the contaminated
sites, Kiel found that housing prices had been stigmatized.
For example, during the year that cleanup efforts began, she
estimated that property values increased by approximately
$6,500 per mile of distance from the Superfund sites.
Messer et al. [2006], using up to 30 years of data for one
contamination site, found that stigmas on residential prop-
erty may result in sale prices taking 5–10 years to recover
after the contamination has been cleaned up.
[14] Stated‐preference studies clearly indicate that people
will pay for protecting and improving groundwater [see
Boyle et al., 1994]. For example, Poe and Bishop [1999]
found that Portage County, Wisconsin residents would pay
as much as $400 per year for a program that would improve
groundwater quality for all households in the county, in-
cluding their own. Stevens et al. [1997] found that house-
holds in selected western Massachusetts towns are willing to
pay $16 to $192 per year for a home tap water treatment
system.
[15] The studies cited above indicate that people do value
safe drinking water. The literature indicates that some, but
not all, homeowners will install private treatment systems in
areas where private well water is known to be contaminated.
This leaves most properties without in‐home water treat-
ment systems to protect residents’ health. Even if a home
treatment system is installed, home buyers may still be wary
because the systems require maintenance and can fail. If
there is general knowledge of groundwater contamination
that is available to home buyers, one might expect potential
buyers to offer less for residential properties in such an area.
However, the potential to control exposure to arsenic in
drinking water through in‐home treatments systems sug-
gests that the stigma would be less severe than has been
observed for Superfund sites.
3. Study Area
[16] Public notification of arsenic contamination should
have motivated home buyers to beware when buying
properties in the communities of Buxton and Hollis. In the
summer of 1993, residents of these two towns became
concerned about arsenic concentrations (greater than
0.05 mg/L) in the local school water supply [Marvinney et
al., 1994]. This led to town‐wide efforts to test for arsenic
and to educate households about the potential health risks of
arsenic in drinking water from private wells. Figure 2 shows
the locations of 1,200 tests of well water that were con-
ducted throughout the two towns. The spatial pattern of
these tests follows the road network. In total, 13.8% of the
test results revealed arsenic concentrations in violation of
the 0.05 mg/L EPA standard. Figure 2 illustrates that the
wells with arsenic test results greater than 0.05 mg/L are
clustered in particular locations within each town.
[17] From 1993 through 2003 there were 121 articles
published in Maine’s two major newspapers (Bangor Daily
News and Portland Press Herald) on arsenic contamination
of drinking water, and 20 of these articles were published in
1993 and 1994 (K. P. Bell et al., University of Maine,
unpublished data, 2008). In 1993, Buxton was the only
Maine community mentioned in the articles. In 1994, both
Buxton and Hollis were mentioned in the articles on arsenic
contamination of well water as well as several nearby towns
where residents were being advised to have their well water
tested. Buxton and Hollis were not mentioned in the media
articles from 1995 through 2003 as it became known that
arsenic contamination of well water was a statewide prob-
lem. The newspaper articles also provided information on
bottled water and home treatment systems during this time.
The newspaper articles were accompanied by reporting of
arsenic contamination of private well water by the television
and radio news media.
[18] Households in Buxton and Hollis that were
concerned about arsenic levels in their tap water could
mitigate the health risks by purchasing bottled water or by
installing a home treatment system [EPA, 2005]. The
treatment system available to homeowners in the early
1990s was reverse osmosis, which could be installed at the
Figure 2. Geographic distribution of arsenic tests.
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point of use (e.g., kitchen sink) or as a whole‐house sys-
tem. The whole‐house system was not reliable and not
recommended.
[19] While potential homebuyers might have been ini-
tially alarmed when arsenic was first found in tap water, this
concern could have dissipated over time as treatment sys-
tems were installed for homes with arsenic concentrations
above the recommended MCL. Nevertheless, a residual
price effect may have persisted because the available treat-
ments were not perfect substitutes for purchasing a home
with tap water that was safe to drink. It would have been
expensive and time consuming for a household to make a
complete switch from tap water to bottled water. It also
would have been expensive for a household to purchase,
install, and maintain a home treatment system. The
recommended treatment technology was a point‐of‐use,
reverse osmosis system. Implementing this recommendation
means that only one water tap in a home would provide safe
drinking water and would leave households with the in-
convenience that not all water taps in the home provide safe
drinking water. In addition, reverse osmosis systems can
fail, which leaves households with a residual risk of expo-
sure to arsenic if tap water was not tested regularly to
identify failures. We would expect the net present value of
these direct and indirect costs to be at least partly capitalized
into property values. In other words, a reduced offer price
for residential properties in Buxton and Hollis might have
reflected the costs of installing a home treatment system or
the perceived residual risk of living in an area with arsenic
in well water.
4. Conceptual Hedonic Property Value
Framework
[20] In Maine the onus is on the buyer of a property to
have knowledge of potential arsenic contamination and to
inquire about this risk. Sellers have a disincentive to test
their well water if they anticipate selling their property. If a
test is conducted, the results of the test must be revealed to
the buyer, but the law does not require the seller to have the
water tested [Maine Department of Professional and
Financial Regulation, 2006]. When sellers have knowl-
edge of arsenic contamination in their tap water they are
likely to inform buyers if they have installed a home treat-
ment system because they are required by law to reveal the
contamination test result. A buyer can physically identify if
a treatment system is in place in a home they are considering
purchasing. This requires looking under the kitchen sink and
at the point of entry where the water supply enters the home.
[21] While a seller must reveal any tap water test results to
potential buyers, the test results for specific properties are
otherwise confidential and are not available to empirical
investigators. This means it is not possible to model sale
prices of homes, which are public information, as a function
of property‐specific arsenic test results. In addition, even if
arsenic test results could be linked to specific sale properties
not all properties would have had an arsenic test. Buyers of
such properties must make purchase decisions based on their
expectations of the likelihood that the water may be con-
taminated with arsenic. In the absence of seller revealed
information, a buyer must have knowledge of the potential
for arsenic contamination of tap water and must take the
initiative to request a water test. In addition, bare land sales
would not have a well available for potential buyers to take
a water sample. A potential source of “data” for buyers to
form this expectation would be inquiries of neighbors to
learn if water from existing wells in the area had con-
centrations of arsenic above the MCL.
[22] In‐home treatment systems are also not known to an
empirical investigator as tax assessors, who maintain prop-
erty data, do not record this information for built properties.
This is an important omitted variable as the installation of
in‐home treatment systems are likely correlated with the
level of arsenic concentrations. More will be said about this
concern in the caveats later in the paper.
[23] Arsenic contamination of groundwater in not a
ubiquitous contaminant in the study area; it tends to be
correlated across space. Groundwater in the study area
occurs in fractured bedrock. As a result, arsenic concentra-
tions above the MCL tend to be patchy. A level of arsenic on
one property above the MCL increases the probability that a
neighboring property’s well water will also have an elevated
level, but concentrations may drop suddenly for properties
just outside of a patch. To capture the spatial correlation in
arsenic levels and the fact that potential homebuyers may
have imperfect information about the degree of arsenic
contamination in specific wells, we model purchases of
housing and bare land as a function of the buyer’s perceived
health risks from arsenic in the neighborhood of the sale
property.
[24] Consider the following stylized argument. A house-
hold obtains utility (U) from the purchase of a home (H) and
a composite (G) of all the other goods and services it
consumes:
U ¼ UðH ;GÞ ð1Þ
and
H ¼ HðS; L;EÞ: ð2Þ
Following Lancaster’s [1966] characteristics approach to
consumer theory, the home (H) can be decomposed into the
various attributes it provides: structural (S), location (L), and
environmental (E). Arsenic contamination of groundwater,
which is used as the source of drinking water, is one of the
environmental attributes. The presence of an in‐home
treatment system for arsenic would be a structural attribute.
The buyer’s expected family health is, therefore, potentially
affected by elements of E and S, the perceived health risks
associated with living in a neighborhood with arsenic con-
centrations above the MCL (an 2 E) and the type of home
treatment device (tr 2 S) available to remove arsenic from
tap water.
[25] Each buyer will choose a property that provides the
set of attributes that maximizes utility from consumption of
H and G, given housing prices, p, income, y, and pre-
ferences for housing attributes and perceived health risks
from arsenic exposure, a. This utility maximization problem
can be written formally as
max
H ;G
U ðH ; G; Þ subject to y ¼ Gþ PðHÞ: ð3Þ
The endogenous perceived health risks (a) are based on
purchasers’ knowledge of potential arsenic exposure, the
health consequences of exposure, and actions they can take
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to mitigate exposure and the risks from exposure. Here, an is
the observed variable that would trigger a household’s
knowledge of arsenic in drinking water and is the only
element of perceived risk that is observable in the hedonic
data. Notice that the price of the composite good, G, has
been normalized to equal 1. Therefore, one additional unit of
G provides the buyer with the same utility as one additional
dollar of income.
[26] Rosen [1974] demonstrated that, in a market equi-
librium, the price of a differentiated good such as housing
will be a function of its attributes, P(H) = P(S, L, E).
Moreover, he demonstrated that the partial derivative of the
hedonic price function with respect to a particular attribute
will measure a buyer’s willingness to pay for a marginal
change in that attribute. To see Rosen’s result, consider the
first‐order condition to the utility maximization problem
with respect to arsenic:
@PðHÞ
@an
¼ @U=an
@G=@G
: ð4Þ
The partial derivative to the left of the equality simply
measures how a small increase in neighborhood arsenic
concentrations affects the market price of a home. The term
to the right of the equality measures the buyer’s valuation of
a small change in arsenic concentrations; in other words, it
measures the amount of money that the buyer would be
willing to trade to avoid a small increase in an. Thus, by
empirically estimating the equilibrium hedonic price func-
tion, P(H) = P(S, L, E), and differentiating it with respect to
neighborhood arsenic concentrations, we can measure how
arsenic concentrations affect property values, and this
property value effect should reflect buyers’ valuation of the
perceived health risks.
[27] Economic theory suggests that the hedonic price
function is generally nonlinear [Ekeland et al., 2004]. Yet,
most empirical hedonic studies treat linearity as a main-
tained assumption. This follows from Cropper et al.’s
[1988] Monte Carlo analysis of how the accuracy in pre-
dicting the marginal willingness to pay for a housing
characteristic varies across competing functional form
assumptions. They find that simpler parametric specifications
for the price function (such as the log linear and log‐log
functional forms) outperform more flexible specifications in
the presence of omitted variables. Therefore, adopting a
simple functional form can help to hedge against the risk of
omitted variable bias.
[28] We estimate the following log linear equilibrium
hedonic price function for the local land market:
lnðpÞ ¼ f S; L;A; tð Þ; ð5Þ
where A is a vector of arsenic variables and t is a vector of
dummy variables that denote each year of sales data. Here,
arsenic is the sole environmental characteristic in the price
function because there were no other known contaminants
of groundwater in the study area over the time period we
investigate. The presence of arsenic in groundwater is highly
unlikely to be correlated with any terrestrial environmental
amenities or disamenities, which implies that the omission
of such variables from this specification will not bias esti-
mated arsenic coefficients. We will clarify this point in the
caveats below. The vector of arsenic variables can be
defined as follows:
A ¼ A an; an  tð Þ: ð6Þ
This specification allows us to test whether arsenic con-
centrations in well water above the MCL create a neigh-
borhood price stigma and whether this stigma increases or
dissipates through time.
[29] Figure 3 presents several possible stigma effects.
Prior to any arsenic findings, the average property value in a
neighborhood is p0. In year t0 people learn that well water in
the neighborhood is contaminated with arsenic. This
decreases the demand for housing in the neighborhood,
decreasing the average property value from p0 to p1. In the
following years, homeowners with arsenic concentrations
above the MCL install water treatment systems so that all
homes with elevated arsenic use treated water by year t1. If
the stigma is permanent, property values will never rebound;
they will remain at p1 despite the fact that water treatment
mitigates the health risk. In a linear parameterization of
equation (6), this would imply a negative coefficient on an
and zero coefficients on all of the interaction effects; the
initial arsenic finding permanently depresses prices. At the
opposite extreme, if there is no stigma, property values
return to their initial levels by t1. An intermediate case
between these two extremes is suggested by McCluskey and
Rausser [2003]. To use their terminology, a “temporary‐
declining stigma” may arise if potential homebuyers are still
wary about the possibility of arsenic contamination even
after the problem has been mitigated. Such a case could arise
due to initial concerns that in‐home treatments systems
might fail and such concerns dissipating through time as
homeowners develop more experience with the systems.
This situation could be represented in a linear parameteri-
zation of equation (6) by a zero coefficient on an, and
negative coefficients on the interaction effects that decline in
magnitude over time, but do not reach zero by year t1.
5. Data
[30] Data were collected for single‐family and bare land
property sales between 1992 and 2003 in the towns of
Buxton and Hollis, Maine. The data range was selected
because 1992 is the year before arsenic in groundwater
became public knowledge in these towns. Sales records in
the Town of Hollis were missing for 1992.
Figure 3. Arsenic “price stigma” on sale prices.
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[31] These towns are largely “bedroom” communities
located in York County, approximately 20 miles west of
Portland, the largest city in the state. Data collected from
town offices include the actual sale price of each property
sold during the study period and the characteristics of the
homes built on those properties. These residences were
mostly built long before arsenic was discovered in the early
1990s (the average structure is approximately 50 years old).
The housing data include structural characteristics of each
home (square footage of living space and age of structure)
and the land characteristics of each property (acreage of lot).
A parsimonious set of explanatory variables is employed
because of inconsistent reporting of house structure and land
characteristics in the property tax data. Including additional
structural and land variables would have substantially
reduced the usable sample sizes.
[32] GIS data on private well arsenic concentrations were
obtained from the Maine Geological Survey. While these
data allowed us to construct “neighborhood” based mea-
sures of arsenic test results, they could not be linked to
individual properties. More precisely, the arsenic measure
we attached to each home is the level of the nearest test
result to exceed the EPA standard of 0.05 mg/L. Recall that
during the time frame that property sales are examined, 1992
through 2003, the EPA standard (MCL) for arsenic was
0.05mg/L. All households in the Buxton/Hollis area were
provided with printed information from the state of Maine’s
toxicologist that tap water with arsenic concentrations in
excess of 0.05mg/L was not safe to drink and posed health
risks, including cancer.
[33] Various alternative measures of “neighborhood”
arsenic levels were also considered including the arsenic
level of the nearest test result to each sold property, the
average arsenic level of test results greater than 0.05 mg/L
for tests within one quarter mile of each sold property, and
the average arsenic level of test results that is greater
than 0.05 mg/L for tests within one half mile of each sold
property. These and other specifications do not substantially
change the results reported below. In general, the more
distant a test result is to a property the less likely it is to have
a price effect.
[34] To estimate the effect of arsenic contamination on
property values in the study area, the natural log of the sales
price of a property was regressed on the following variables:
IMPROVED, equals 1 if a property includes a house and zero
otherwise; SQFT*IMPROVED, square feet of living space
in‐house multiplied by IMPROVED; AGE*IMPROVED,
age of the house multiplied by IMPROVED; ACRES, lot size
in acres; ti, a series of indicator variables that equal 1 for each
study year (i) and 0 otherwise (2003 is the omitted category);
an, arsenic concentration of nearest test result in excess of
0.05mg/L (coded as parts per billion (ppb) (50 ppb =
>0.05mg/L); and an*ti. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics
for these variables.
[35] The year indicator variables deserve some explana-
tion. Given the semilog form of the price function in
equation (5), adding the year indicators allows sale prices to
adjust by a different percentage each year. This controls for
inflation by effectively deflating sale prices, while simulta-
neously capturing year‐to‐year variation in the data due to
unobserved market factors that are not related to the char-
acteristics of individual properties. If the location of a new
business were to create new jobs in Buxton and Hollis, for
example, the year indicators would absorb the subsequent
percentage change in property values. The year indicators
also serve to control for the local effects of national market
trends, particularly the housing market boom that began in
the late 1990s and the brief recession that occurred in 2001.
6. Results
[36] The parsimonious set of explanatory variables un-
derscores the importance of controlling for spatial correlation
in the unobserved characteristics of houses and neighbor-
hoods. If the prices of homes in a neighborhood are corre-
lated because they share similar design features that are
observed by buyers, but not by the researcher, then this
correlation can bias the standard errors from ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation. This potential problem can be
addressed by testing to detect if a pattern of spatial corre-
lation exists in the residuals from OLS estimation and then
adjusting the standard errors accordingly [Anselin, 1988,
2002].
[37] One of the standard test statistics used to detect the
presence of spatial correlation is Moran’s I. A positive value
indicates that the OLS residuals are positively correlated.
We found positive Moran’s I statistics that were significant
in separate regressions for Buxton and Hollis. The p value
for Moran’s I was 0.001 for a regression using the Hollis
data and 0.00001 for a regression using the Buxton data.
Given the presence of spatial correlation, we investigated
whether the data are best explained by correlation in the
dependent variable (a spatial lag model) or by correlation in
the error terms (a spatial error model). This was done using a
series of Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests, following the
approach suggested by Anselin [2002]. For each of the
towns, LM tests failed to reject both the spatial lag model
and the spatial error model. However, robust LM tests
strongly suggested the spatial error model over the spatial
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Buxtona Hollisb
Mean SD Mean SD
SALEPRICE 91,015 60,410 97,681 61,334
ln(PRICE) 11.12 0.90 11.21 0.88
IMPROVED 0.78 0.41 0.82 0.38
SQFT*IMPROVED 728.90 446.12 769.19 460.08
AGE*IMPROVED 36.21 53.35 40.55 54.06
ACRES 4.56 9.55 5.67 16.87
AS > 0.05 (ppb)c 86.36 28.07 93.33 59.95
t1992 0.05 0.21 NAd NA
t1993 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21
t1994 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23
t1995 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29
t1996 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
t1997 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28
t1998 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.32
t1999 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33
t2000 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32
t2001 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.16
t2002 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33
t2003 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33
aFor Buxton, n = 1,669. SD is standard deviation.
bFor Hollis, n = 542. SD is standard deviation.
cArsenic Concentrations measured in parts per billion (ppb), 50 ppb =
>0.05 mg/L.
dNo sales data were available for Hollis for 1992.
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lag model. Therefore, we estimated spatial error models.
The spatial weights matrix takes a dichotomous form where
all “neighbors” are assigned a value of 1 and all “non-
neighbors” are assigned a value of 0. The distances used to
define neighbors were the minimum distances such that each
property had at least one neighbor.
[38] The first two columns of Table 2 report the results
from spatial error models that were estimated for Buxton
and Hollis individually. The positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients on IMPROVED indicate that, as we
would expect, properties with homes have much higher sale
prices than those without, and sale prices for properties with
homes are increasing in the size of the home (SQFT*IMP).
While properties with older homes tend to be less expensive
(AGE*IMP), this result is not statistically significant.
Likewise, lot size (ACRE) does not have a statistically
significant effect on prices. The l parameter measures the
degree of spatial correlation in the residuals to the model;
the significant, positive values for Buxton and Hollis indi-
cate that nearby properties tend to share similar features.
[39] By interacting the neighborhood arsenic measure (an)
with dummy variables for each year (T1992*an,…,
T2002*an) the empirical hedonic model allows us to mea-
sure the extent that property values are affected by arsenic
concentrations in excess of the MCL over time. Since the
interaction dummy is excluded for the last year of our data
(2003), the coefficient on an measures the price effect of
arsenic in 2003. It is not statistically different from zero for
either town, indicating that any property price effect from
the initial arsenic findings in 1993 had disappeared 10 years
later. This implies that there is not a permanent stigma.
[40] The interaction coefficient for 1992 is also effectively
zero for the Buxton data, as we would expect. This finding
provides a consistency check on our model since people did
not learn about arsenic in well water until the following
year.
[41] After people learned about the arsenic findings, there
were temporary price effects in each town that disappeared
with time. All else constant, the prices of properties located
in neighborhoods with arsenic readings above 0.05 mg/L
dropped significantly in 1993 and 1994 for Buxton and
dropped significantly in 1995 for Hollis. The interaction
coefficient for Buxton in 1993 (−0.0105) implies that a
0.01 mg/L increase in neighborhood arsenic test readings
above the EPA standard temporarily decreased the resale
value of a property by approximately 1%. The size of this
effect decreased to 0.7% in 1994 and was not statistically
different from zero thereafter. For the town of Hollis, we
find no statistically significant effects in 1993 and 1994,
before prices dropped in 1995. The coefficient on T1995*an
implies that prices in Hollis dropped by approximately 0.6%
per 0.01 mg/L increase in neighborhood arsenic, similar to
the 1994 decrease in Buxton.
[42] A likely explanation for why the price effects for the
two towns are staggered over time is that Buxton is where
the school drinking water was found to have arsenic in 1993
so concern may have been more immediate in this com-
munity. Furthermore, Buxton was the only town mentioned
in the stream of newspaper articles published in 1993. Hollis
was mentioned in some of the articles published the fol-
lowing year. Since it may have taken some time for this
information to be absorbed by potential homebuyers, it
makes sense that prices in Hollis would have gone down in
1995. After 1995, some of the interaction coefficients in
Table 2 are still negative, but none are statistically different
from zero. Thus, the property price effect of the initial
arsenic finding in 1993 and the subsequent news stories in
1993 and 1994 appears to have mostly disappeared by 1996.
7. Caveats and Robustness Checks
[43] There are three important caveats to our econometric
results. First, is our assumption that the true shape of the
Table 2. Estimated Hedonic Price Equationsa
Variable Buxton Hollis Pooled
IMPROVED 0.8342*** (0.0920) 0.9633*** (0.1340) 0.8712*** (0.0752)
ACRE −0.0019 (0.0020) 0.0007 (0.0018) −0.0004 (0.0013)
SQFT*IMP 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
AGE*IMP −0.0004 (0.0004) −0.0006 (0.0007) −0.0004 (0.0003)
an 0.0019 (0.0021) 0.0007 (0.0013) 0.0012 (0.0011)
T1992*an 0.0016 (0.0038) 0.0022 (0.0034)
T1993*an −0.0105*** (0.0032) 0.0009 (0.0026) 0.0011 (0.0026)
T1994*an −0.0066** (0.0033) 0.0004 (0.0018) 0.0001 (0.0019)
T1995*an −0.0025 (0.0036) −0.0055 (0.0024)** −0.0060 (0.0025)**
T1993*an*Buxton −0.0110 (0.0034)***
T1994*an*Buxton −0.0059 (0.0030)**
T1995*an*Buxton 0.0042 (0.0037)
T1996*an −0.0004 (0.0033) −0.0011 (0.0018) −0.0011 (0.0017)
T1997*an −0.0027 (0.0031) 0.0011 (0.0016) 0.0003 (0.0015)
T1998*an −0.0014 (0.0030) 0.0014 (0.0023) 0.0002 (0.0019)
T1999*an −0.0003 (0.0030) 0.0002 (0.0021) 0.0000 (0.0018)
T2000*an −0.0002 (0.0027) 0.0007 (0.0023) 0.0006 (0.0017)
T2001*an −0.0012 (0.0028) 0.0079 (0.0159) −0.0001 (0.0021)
T2002*an −0.0033 (0.0028) 0.0026 (0.0024) −0.0008 (0.0018)
Constant 10.5794*** (0.2014) 10.6439*** (0.1597) 10.6273*** (0.1178)
l 0.3529*** (0.1064) 0.2458*** (0.0822) 0.3812*** (0.0793)
R2 0.3310 0.3970 0.3450
N 1669 542 2211
aThree asterisks denote significance at the 0.01 level; two asterisks denote significance at the 0.05 level, and one asterisk
denotes significance at the 0.1 level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include dummy variables for the sale
year.
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equilibrium hedonic price function is log linear. As dis-
cussed earlier, Cropper et al. [1988] found that log linear
and log‐log specifications for the price function out-
performed more flexible specifications in the presence of
omitted variables. As a robustness check on the sensitivity
of our results to the choice of the log linear specification, we
also estimated a log‐log model where all of the strictly
positive variables were transformed using natural logs; that
is, the arsenic variable multiplied by the year indicator
variables were not logged. This had a negligible effect on
the arsenic results reported in Table 2. For example, the
arsenic interaction for Hollis in 1995 decreased in absolute
magnitude from −0.0055 to −0.0052, with no change in
statistical significance. (Full results from the log‐log model
and other robustness checks described below are contained
in a supplemental appendix provided on the first author’s
Web page.)
[44] The second caveat to our analysis concerns the im-
plications of housing market adjustment. Recent research on
household sorting behavior has stressed the difficulty in
assessing the costs and benefits of changes in environmental
quality when people are freely mobile [Epple and Sieg,
1999; Smith et al., 2004; Kuminoff, 2009]. Intuitively, the
households who sold their homes in Buxton and Hollis
between 1993 and 1995 may have chosen to move out of
these communities partly due to a strong desire to reduce
their exposure to arsenic. Likewise, the households who
moved into the two towns may have been less worried about
the future health consequences. This type of sorting
behavior would imply that the drop in property values that
we observed for Buxton in 1993 and 1994 and for Hollis in
1995 would understate the amount that the households who
moved out of the two towns would be willing to pay to
avoid the risks of arsenic exposure. Thus, the 0.5% to 1%
decreases in property values that we observe are best
interpreted as lower bounds on the willingness to pay to
avoid arsenic exposure by the households who lived in the
two towns at the beginning of our study period. That said,
the cost of installing a point‐of‐use treatment system was
only about $411 at this time, which is likely much less than
the cost of moving. Even a point‐of‐entry system for a
whole house, at an installation cost of $5,000 to $10,000,
may be less than the cost of moving. In addition, arsenic was
also subsequently identified in communities neighboring
Buxton and Hollis (e.g., neighboring Standish), and
throughout the state of Maine, which may have diminished
the desire to relocate. Given these considerations and the
price stigma dissipating through time, the 0.5% to 1%
decreases may not be substantial underestimates.
[45] The final caveat to our analysis concerns the limita-
tions of our data. While our spatial error models provide an
indirect control for spatial correlation in unobserved vari-
ables, we would also like to be able to directly control for
more structural housing characteristics such as the number
of bathrooms and whether the home has a fireplace, a
basement, a garage or an in‐home treatment system for
arsenic. Unfortunately, these data are not collected or
reported by the assessors in Buxton and Hollis. Following a
suggestion from a referee, we tried adding quadratic func-
tions of the observed structural characteristics to the model
to help control for the effect of unobserved structural
characteristics. Four additional terms were added: SQFT2,
AGE2, ACRES2, and AGE*SQFT. These terms will help to
control for unobserved characteristics to the extent that they
are correlated. For example, if newer homes tend to have
more bathrooms and larger bedrooms, these unobserved
characteristics will be correlated with AGE*SQFT. Adding
the quadratic functions of observed characteristics to the
Buxton and Hollis models increased their explanatory power
slightly, as measured by the R2, by 0.01 for Buxton and by
0.008 for Hollis. However, it did not affect the magnitude of
the arsenic coefficients or their statistical significance.
[46] The absence of a variable indicating an in‐home
treatment system is problematic because this variable is
likely correlated with an. This means that sold properties
with and without a home treatment system are treated the
same in the estimation. If the presence of an in‐home
treatment system reduces price suppression, as we would
expect, then treating sales of homes with and without these
systems the same in our econometric model would cause us
to underestimate willingness to pay. This reinforces our
interpretation of the 0.5% to 1% decreases in property
values as lower bounds on the willingness to pay to avoid
arsenic exposure.
[47] It is also natural to be concerned about omitted
environmental amenities. Unlike other recent hedonic
studies of health risk [e.g., Davis, 2004], we do not have
data on repeated sales of individual homes that would allow
us to control for time‐constant omitted amenities using
parcel‐specific fixed effects. If an amenity that matters to
households is correlated with our measure for arsenic con-
centrations, it may confound our estimates for the property
value effect of arsenic. However, in order for an omitted
variable to bias our results, the omitted variable would have
to be spatially correlated with arsenic concentrations and
temporally correlated with the spread of information about
arsenic findings. This seems unlikely. One reason is that
arsenic concentrations tend to be patchy due to features of
the underlying bedrock that have little to do with how the
land above is utilized. Moreover, if an unobserved amenity
were correlated with arsenic concentrations we would
expect to see an effect on property values before the public
learned about arsenic in well water. This is not the case. Our
econometric results indicate that, after controlling for
observed property characteristics, there were no significant
differences in the prices of properties located in high‐arsenic
areas; that is, the coefficient on T1992*an is not statistically
different from zero for Buxton.
[48] Finally, because many of the coefficients of the
Buxton and Hollis models are not statistically different from
each other, we estimated a pooled version of the model that
combines the data from both towns, but allows the price
effect of arsenic to differ across the two towns between 1993
and 1995. The results are reported in the third column of
Table 2. For example, the coefficient on T1993*an measures
the baseline effect of arsenic for both towns in 1993 and the
coefficient on T1993*an*Buxton measure the deviation
from this baseline for Buxton. While there are slight changes
in the magnitudes of some of the coefficients, the overall
pattern of results is the same as in the town‐specific
regressions. In short, arsenic levels above the MCL appear
to have decreased property values in Buxton during 1993–
1994 and appear to have decreased property values in Hollis
during 1995.
[49] Overall, the pattern of results in Table 2 allows us to
clearly reject the null hypothesis of a “permanent stigma” as
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illustrated in Figure 3. In addition, logical intuition suggests
that the price decreases of 0.5% to 1% are lower‐bound
estimates on what households would be willing to pay to
avoid arsenic exposure. However, the results do not allow us
to distinguish between “no stigma” and “temporary stigma.”
Distinguishing between these two effects would require
tracking whether the installation of home treatment systems
over time matched the time path of the property value effect
of arsenic. As noted earlier, data on the installation of home
treatment systems are not currently collected or reported.
Using household surveys to collect these data and investi-
gate the empirical form of stigma would be an interesting
direction for future research.
8. Conclusion and Discussion
[50] This paper has investigated the impact of arsenic
contamination of groundwater on the markets for land and
housing in the Maine towns of Buxton and Hollis. Media
attention focused on these communities in 1993 and 1994
when 14% of private wells were found to have concentrations
of arsenic that exceeded the EPA standard of 0.05 mg/L.
Our statistical results indicate that finding arsenic in drink-
ing water led to significant, but temporary, decreases in
property prices. Property prices rebounded three years after
arsenic contamination became common knowledge.
[51] These findings imply that notification by the state of
Maine, supported by media coverage, did have an effect on
risk perceptions as revealed through lower sales prices of
properties near arsenic test results that exceeded the MCL.
In addition, the results suggest that a property‐specific
contamination incident that is treatable does not have a
long‐lasting effect on sale prices of residential properties.
This suggests that long‐term stigmas, such as those found
by Kiel [1995], McCluskey and Rausser [2003], and Messer
et al. [2006], may be unlikely outside of locations such as
Superfund sites where all properties in an area are adversely
affected to a greater or lesser degree and there is little that
nearby households can do to reduce their level of exposure,
other than move. In contrast, because arsenic is treatable,
households can control their level of exposure by installing
in‐home treatment systems. The installation costs are
absorbed by homeowners and the value of the installed
systems is capitalized into the resale value of the homes.
[52] While the installation of in‐home treatment systems
helps to explain why arsenic did not permanently decrease
property prices in Buxton and Hollis, the brief duration of
the decrease is somewhat surprising. This may be at least
partly explained by imperfect information and variation in
subjective risk perceptions. For example, Shaw et al. [2005]
find that only 38% of households with private wells treat
their tap in Churchill County, Nevada despite the fact that
the median arsenic concentration in the county is more than
5 times the EPA standard. The other 62% of households
may be unaware that arsenic concentrations exceed the EPA
standard, unaware that elevated arsenic levels pose a serious
health risk, or may think that the risk is low for their
household.
[53] An alternative, and complementary, explanation for
why property prices rebounded so quickly in Buxton and
Hollis is that once the flow of newspaper articles about these
two towns stopped in 1995, potential homebuyers may have
mistakenly assumed the danger had passed. For example,
Rogers [1997, p. 292] concludes “…that the social pro-
cesses that construct and maintain [emphasis added] risk in
the public eye are at least as important as, if not more
important than, the physical and psychological dimension of
risk.” Studies by Brown and Schrader [1990] (cholesterol
and heart disease linkages to egg consumption) and
M. Neidell (Public information and avoidance behavior: Do
people respond to smog alerts?, unpublished manuscript,
2006, available at http://econweb.tamu.edu/workshops/PERC%
20Applied%20Microeconomics/Matthew%20Neidell.pdf)
(smog alerts in southern California) found that public risk
perceptions were affected through sustained and focused
media programs. These findings are supported by experi-
mental studies by Smith and Johnson [1988] and Smith et al.
[1995], which found that targeted, prescriptive information
about radon and in‐home treatment affected risk percep-
tions. Thus, the lack of sustained, focused media attention
likely did reduce the perceived risk of arsenic by some
residents of Buxton and Hollis. The longer price effects of
Superfund sites, therefore, may be due to risks that house-
holds cannot control and sustained media attention on these
sites over many years.
[54] Important directions for future research include
investigating whether potential homebuyers’ subjective risk
perceptions about arsenic exposure and the reliability of
treatment systems are consistent with the scientific evidence.
In addition, studies of different areas and applications can
reveal whether the short‐term price suppression that occurs
for other risks is due to the risk being treatable by household
mitigation actions, or is due to media attention on the risks
being limited in time, or a combination of both.
[55] In the current situation the significant, short‐term
price effect clearly indicates that the state of Maine’s noti-
fication of arsenic risks in drinking water in the communi-
ties of Buxton and Hollis, supported by media coverage, had
a nearly immediate effect, but this research does not indicate
if all households who have arsenic concentrations in excess
of 0.05 mg/L in their tap water took action to protect their
family members from the risks of exposure. A follow‐up
investigation is clearly warranted to confirm whether all
households at risk did in fact take remediation actions to
mitigate exposure to arsenic in their tap water.
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